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COMMENTS




A CORPORATE stock redemption is a taxable event to a share-
holder.' The tax treatment of this event has long been a highly
contested issue between the Internal Revenue Service and share-
holders. Individual shareholders would prefer to have the redemption
treated as a sale or exchange of property to take advantage of capital gain
tax rates.2 To qualify for this treatment, a shareholder must meet the re-
quirements of Internal Revenue Code section 302(b). 3 If the redemption
Editor's Note: Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, as amended, which is codified in title 26 of the United States Code.
Internal Revenue Code sections are cited to the 1982 permanent edition of the United States
Code, if therein. Otherwise, code sections are cited to the main edition and/or current sup-
plement of the United States Code Annotated, published by West Publishing Company. All
Treasury Regulations are cited by section number and may be found in 26 C.F.R. (1983)
unless otherwise indicated.
1. A stock redemption is defined as a corporation's acquisition of "its stock from a
shareholder in exchange for property, whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled,
retired, or held as treasury stock." I.R.C. § 317(b) (1982). Stock redemptions are taxable
under I.R.C. §§ 301, 302 (1982).
2. Individuals may deduct 60% of the excess of their net long-term capital gain over
their net short-term capital loss. Id §§ 1202, 1222. As a result, only 40% of any proceeds
qualifying for capital gain treatment is taxable, whereas ordinary income, including divi-
dends, is fully taxable. Id § 301(c).
3. Id § 302 provides:
(a) GeneralRule.-If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of
section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies,
such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in
exchange for the stock.
(b) Redemptions Treated as Exchanges.-
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends.-Subsection (a) shall apply
if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock.-
(A) In general.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is
substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(B) Limitation.-This paragraph shall not apply unless immedi-
ately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote.
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does not qualify for capital gain treatment, the proceeds will be considered
a dividend distribution,4 which is taxable at ordinary income rates.5 Sec-
tion 302(b) sets out three situations in which a stock redemption will be
treated as a sale or exchange: first, when the redemption is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend;6 second, when the redemption is substantially
disproportionate; 7 and third, when the redemption completely terminates a
shareholder's interest in a corporation. 8
A shareholder's stock ownership in a corporation must be determined to
apply the three criteria of section 302(b) to a redemption situation. In de-
termining a redeeming shareholder's stock ownership for purposes of that
section, section 302(c) requires that the attribution rules in Code section
318(a) 9 be applied.10 Only in limited cases may these attribution rules be
(C) Definitions.-For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution
is substantially disproportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by
the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all of
the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by
the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to all of
the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as
substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of
the common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting)
after and before redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement
of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
if there is more than one class of common stock, the determinations
shall be made by reference to fair market value.
(D) Series of redemptions.-This paragraph shall not apply to any
redemption made pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect of which
is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribution which (in the
aggregate) is not substantially disproportionate with respect to the
shareholder.
(3) Termination of shareholder's interest.-Subsection (a) shall apply if
the redemption is in complete redemption of all of the stock of the corpo-
ration owned by the shareholder.
(5) Application ofparagraphs.-In determining whether a redemption
meets the requirements of paragraph (1), the fact that such redemption
fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (2), (3), or (4) shall not be
taken into account.
4. A dividend distribution is defined as "any distribution of property made by a corpo-
ration to its shareholders . . . out of its earnings and profits." Id. § 316(a).
5. See id. § 301(c)(1). Section 301(c)(1) provides that a distribution constituting a divi-
dend is includable in gross income. The type of corporate distribution that is considered a
dividend is determined under I.R.C. § 316(a) (1982).
6. Id § 302(b)(1).
7. Id. § 302(b)(2).
8. Id. § 302(b)(3).
9. Id § 318(a). The attribution rules are technical rules under which specific entity
and individual corporate shareholders, as a result of their relationship with other sharehold-
ers, will be deemed to constructively own stock of the other shareholders. Id. The rationale
behind the attribution rules is that certain relationships are likely to encompass a commu-
nity of economic interest, in which individuals and entities will act to benefit the entire
community. Therefore, when one community member reduces his interest in a corporation,
this event will have little impact on corporate control if other community members retain an




One specific area of controversy in the redemption field is the impact
that family hostility should have in alleviating the harsh results of apply-
ing attribution rules to stock redemptions. When more than one family
member owns stock in a corporation and hostility exists between these
members, a stock redemption is one method used to resolve the discord,
since an unhappy family member can thereby terminate his interest in the
corporation.' 2 The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that
the constructive ownership rules of section 318 must be mechanically ap-
plied to a shareholder who has actually terminated his interest in the cor-
poration.' 3 The service asserts that particular facts and circumstances may
not circumvent the application of the family attribution rules.' 4 Judicial
decisions, however, have tended to disregard the attribution rules when
family discord has been present.' 5
Closely related to this family hostility issue is the question of whether
the statutory waiver of the attribution rules under section 302(c)(2) may be
extended to trusts and estates. A waiver can provide significant benefits to
redeeming shareholders when family hostility exists. The Internal Reve-
nue Service has maintained that an entity may not waive the application of
section 318(a) to stock redemptions, contending that the privilege belongs
exclusively to individuals.' 6 Case law, however, has expanded the scope of
the statutory waiver beyond individuals to trusts and estates. ' 7
These divergent IRS and judicial positions regarding family hostility
and an entity's ability to waive the attribution rules led to the litigation of
these issues in a recent Fifth Circuit case, Metzger Trust v. Commissioner.'8
Disregarding the holdings reached in other courts,' 9 the Fifth Circuit sup-
of the Concepts of "The Family, " "Related Parties, " "Control," and 'Attribution of Owner-
ship," 15 TAX L. REV. 253, 255 (1960).
10. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1) (1982).
11. See id. § 302(c)(2)(A); infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
12. Other methods feuding family members might use to resolve their dispute is to have
one member sell his stock directly to another member instead of to the corporation, or to
have all family members terminate their interests in the corporation through a sale to an
unrelated party. See Cohen, Corporate Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 37passim (1955).
13. Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 67.
14. Id at 66, 67.
15. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 46-48 (1st Cir. 1975); Parker v. Com-
missioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893, 900-01 (1961); Estate of Squier v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
950, 955-56 (1961), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted 1978-2 C.B. 5.
16. See Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 C.B. 122, 123; Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106, 107.
17. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 941, 955 (1979) (scope of statutory waivers
expanded to include trusts); Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830, 835-37 (1972), nonacq.
1974-2 C.B. 5 (scope of statutory waivers expanded to include estates). The passage of § 228
of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 statutorily mandated this expanded
scope. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 [hereinafter cited as TEFRA], Pub.
L. No. 97-248, § 228, 96 Stat. 493, 515 (amending I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(C)).
18. 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1388 (1983).
19. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 46-48 (1st Cir. 1975); Parker v. Com-
missioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893, 900-01 (1961); Estate of Squier v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
950, 955-56 (1961), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted 1978-2 C.B. 5
(existence of family hostility allowed to mitigate application of attribution rules).
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ported the IRS view that family hostility should not mitigate the applica-
tion of attribution rules 20 and that a trust could not waive the attribution
rules.21 The court recognized, however, that its decision would not have a
lasting effect on the law22 because Congress had recently passed section
228 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),
which amended the scope of statutory waivers under section 302(c). 23 The
amended section allows an entity to waive the family attribution rules,
provided that all related persons can also be induced to waive the rules.24
This Comment will discuss the relevance of family hostility and an en-
tity's ability to waive the attribution rules on the tax treatment afforded a
shareholder involved in a stock redemption. First, the pertinent provisions
of Code sections 302 and 318 are outlined and their legislative history ex-
amined. The recent case law relating to family hostility and entity waivers
is then discussed. Finally, the effect of the TEFRA amendment to section
302(c) on the tax treatment of future stock redemptions is analyzed.
I. STOCK REDEMPTIONS AND FAMILY ATTRIBUTION RULES IN
GENERAL
A. Code Provisions
Code sections 302 and 318 are crucial to the understanding of how fam-
ily hostility and entity waiver of family attribution rules can affect a share-
holder's tax treatment of a stock redemption. For a stock redemption to be
treated as an exchange of property, under section 302(a), section 302(b)
mandates that the transaction must be either not essentially equivalent to a
dividend, a substantially disproportionate redemption, or a complete ter-
mination of the shareholder's interest. 25 If the redemption does not meet
any of these tests, it is treated as a distribution of property to which section
301 applies. 26 Under section 301(c), a distribution from a corporation's
20. 693 F.2d at 465-68.
21. Id. at 470.
22. Id. at 468.
23. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 228, 95 Stat. 493, 515 (amending I.R.C. § 302(c)
(2)(C)). This amendment became effective as section 302(c)(2)(C) after August 31, 1982. Id
The Metzger Trust opinion was delivered on December 13, 1982. Although the court in
Metzger Trust properly concluded that § 228 of TEFRA amended the scope of statutory
waivers, the court was actually incorrect in assuming that its decision would not have a
lasting effect on the law. The trust in Metzger Trust was not attempting to waive the family
attribution rules, but rather the entity attribution rules. See H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 545, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1190, 1391.
24. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(C) (1982) provides in part:
(C) Special Rule for Waivers by Entities.-
(i) In General-Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a distribution to any
entity unless-
(I) such entity and each related person meet the requirements of clauses
(i), (ii), and (iii) of subparagraph (A), and
(II) each related person agrees to be jointly and severally liable for any
deficiency (including interest and additions to tax) resulting from an acquisi-
tion described in clause (ii) of subparagraph (A).
25. I.R.C. § 302(b)(l)-(3) (1982). For complete text of § 302, see supra note 3.
26. I.R.C. § 302(d) (1982).
[Vol. 38
COMMENTS
earnings and profits is considered a dividend taxable at ordinary tax
rates. 27 A distribution in excess of the dividend amount reduces a share-
holder's basis in the stock, 28 and any amount in excess of the basis is
treated as a gain from the exchange of property.29
The first test in section 302(b) provides that a redemption will be treated
as an exchange if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend.30 The Code itself does not clarify this criterion; the Treasury Regu-
lations, however, do provide some guidance. The regulations state that
whether a distribution in redemption of a shareholder's stock is essentially
equivalent to a dividend depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case. 3' One of the facts to be considered is the application of the construc-
tive ownership rules under section 318(a) to the shareholder.32 The indefi-
niteness of this first test under section 302(b) has made it the center of
varying judicial interpretations and conflict. The presence of family hostil-
ity, one of the facts used to determine dividend equivalence, has in effect
helped cause this judicial confusion. 33
The second test in section 302(b) permits exchange treatment if the re-
demption results in a substantially disproportionate reduction of a share-
holder's stock in a corporation. 34 A redemption qualifies under this test if:
(1) the shareholder owns less than fifty percent of the total combined vot-
ing power of all classes of voting stock immediately after the redemption; 35
(2) the shareholder's percentage of voting stock owned after the redemp-
tion is less than eighty percent of the shareholder's percentage of voting
stock owned before the redemption;36 and (3) the shareholder's percentage
of common stock, voting and nonvoting combined, owned after the re-
demption is less than eighty percent of the shareholder's percentage of
common stock owned before the redemption. 37 This standard will not ap-
ply to any redemption that is part of a planned series of redemptions that
fails to be substantially disproportionate to the shareholders when consid-
ered in the aggregate. 38
The third test allows a redemption to be treated as an exchange if made
in complete redemption of all of a shareholder's stock in the corporation.39
A shareholder therefore must completely terminate his interest in a corpo-
ration to qualify for exchange treatment under this criterion. Although
this standard does not seem to cover any situation not already covered by
27. Id. § 301(c)(1).
28. Id § 301(c)(2).
29. Id § 301(c)(3).
30. Id § 302(b)(1).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
32. Id
33. See infra notes 97-138 and accompanying text.
34. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1982).
35. Id § 302(b)(2)(B).
36. Id. § 302(b)(2)(C).
37. Id. § 302(b)(2)(C) (last paragraph).
38. Id § 302(b)(2)(D).
39. Id. § 302(b)(3).
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the substantially disproportionate test, section 302(c) makes this criterion
more useful when family members continue to own shares in a corporation
after a complete redemption. Again, family hostility and an entity's ability
to waive the family attribution rules have been controversial judicial con-
siderations when this third test has been applied to stock redemptions.40
Section 302(c) requires that the constructive ownership rules of section
318(a) must be applied in determining a shareholder's stock ownership. 4'
When determining whether a shareholder has completely terminated his
interest, however, the family attribution rules in section 318(a)(1) will be
waived if: (1) immediately after the distribution the distributee retains no
interest in the corporation, except that of a creditor;42 (2) the distributee
acquires no interest within ten years of the redemption date unless by be-
quest or inheritance;43 and (3) the distributee files an agreement with the
IRS to notify it of any acquisition of a prohibited interest during a ten-year
period after the redemption.44 Even if a distributee meets the above three
requirements, he will not be able to waive the attribution rules in section
318(a)(1) if: (1) any of the redeemed stock was acquired by the distributee
within a ten-year period prior to the redemption from a person whose
stock would be attributed to the distributee under the attribution rules;45
or (2) any person within the scope of the attribution rules acquired stock
from the distributee within a ten-year period prior to the redemption, un-
less that stock was redeemed in the same transaction.46 These two condi-
tions will apply only if one of the principal purposes of the transaction was
the avoidance of federal income tax. 47
The constructive ownership rules in section 318(a) can have a significant
effect upon the tax treatment afforded a taxpayer in a stock redemption. 48
The relationships that require attribution are those that Congress viewed
as likely to encompass a community of economic interest among the par-
ties such that one party's stock reduction would not be a significant eco-
nomic event if other community members continued to hold stock in the
same corporation.49 The types of attribution in section 318(a) can be di-
40. See Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459, 463-67 (5th Cir. 1982) (attribu-
tion rules must be mechanically applied even when family hostility exists), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3537, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1388 (1983); Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 941, 955
(1979) (trusts may waive the family attribution rules under § 302(c)).
41. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1) (1982).
42. Id. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
43. Id. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii).
44. Id. § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii).
45. Id. § 302(c)(2)(B)(i).
46. Id. § 302(c)(2)(B)(ii).
47. Id. § 302(c)(2)(B) (last paragraph).
48. For discussions of the attribution rules, see Goldstein, Bringing the Attribution Rules
into Sharper Focus; How and Where They Apply, 26 J. TAX'N 280 (1967); Reilly, supra note
9; Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue Code, 72
HARV. L. REV. 209 (1958); Winston, Attribution of Stock Ownership From Stock Options
Under the Internal Revenue Code, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 482 (1977).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CONG. &
AD. NEws 4025, 4061:
At the present time a possible opportunity for tax avoidance results where
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vided into four categories. Stock can be attributed from one family mem-
ber to another,50 from entities to those who hold a beneficial interest in
them," to entities from those who hold a beneficial interest in them 5 2 and
to those who hold options to acquire stock.53
Under the family attribution rules an individual is considered to own
stock that is owned directly or indirectly by his spouse, children, grandchil-
dren, and parents.54 Once stock is attributed from one family member to
another, this stock may not be reattributed from the latter to other family
members.55 Only these family attribution rules may be waived in a com-
plete stock redemption under section 302(b).56
Under section 318(a)(2), stock owned directly or indirectly by partner-
ships, estates, trusts, and corporations will be attributed to those who hold
a beneficial interest in them.5 7 Stock owned by a partnership or estate is
attributed proportionately to the partners or estate beneficiaries.5 8 Stock
owned by a trust is attributed to its beneficiaries in proportion to their
actuarial interest in the trust.5 9 Finally stock owned by a corporation is
attributed proportionately to stockholders owning at least fifty percent of
the corporation's stock.60 Likewise, under section 318(a)(3) stock owned
directly or indirectly by individuals is attributed to the entities in which
they hold a beneficial interest.61 Stock owned by a partner, estate benefici-
ary, or shareholder owning at least fifty percent of a corporation's stock is
fully attributed to the respective entity. 62 Stock owned by a trust benefici-
redemptions are effected in the case of family-owned corporations. To pre-
vent tax avoidance, but at the same time to provide definite rules for the gui-
dance of taxpayers, your committee has provided precise standards whereby
under specific circumstances, a shareholder may be considered as owning
stock held by members of his immediate family (or by partnerships, corpora-
tions, or trusts which he controls).
• . .[T]he family attribution rules will be applied to insure a bona fide sever-
ance of a particular shareholder's interest in an enterprise ...
50. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (1982). These attribution rules are referred to as the family attri-
bution rules. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.21, at 9-13 to -14 (4th ed. 1979).
51. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2) (1982).
52. Id § 318(a)(3). The attribution rules in §§ 318(a)(2) and 318(a)(3) between entities
and individuals are referred to as the entity attribution rules. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE,
supra note 50, 9.21, at 9-14 to -15.
53. I.R.C. § 318(a)(4) (1982).
54. Id. § 318(a)(1)(A). A spouse who is legally separated from the taxpayer under a
divorce decree or separate maintenance decree will not be treated as a spouse for purposes of
§ 318(a)(1). Id § 318(a)(l)(A)(i). Also, Congress apparently did not view siblings as be-
longing to the same community of economic interest, since they are not included in the
definition of family members. See id Stock will not be attributed directly from one brother
or sister to another. McCaffrey, Post-Mortem Section 302 Redemptions and the Attribution
Rules, 15 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1204.2, at 12-11 (1981).
55. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(B) (1982).
56. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
57. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2) (1982).
58. Id. § 318(a)(2)(A)-(C).
59. Id § 318(a)(2)(B)(i).
60. Id. § 318(a)(2)(C).
61. Id § 318(a)(3).
62. Id. § 318(a)(3)(A)-(C).
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ary is fully attributed to the trust, unless the beneficiary has only a remote,
contingent interest in the trust.63 As with the family attribution rules, once
stock is attributed to one of the above entities, this stock may not be reat-
tributed to another who holds a beneficial interest in the entity.64
Section 318(a)(4) provides that if an individual has an option to acquire
stock, that stock should be attributed to that person. 65 In a situation in
which both the option and family attribution rules can apply, the option
attribution rule will take precedence. 66 Thus, contrary to the family attri-
bution rules, optioned stock attributed to a family member may be reat-
tributed to another member of the option holder's family. 67
Although at first glance these attribution rules seem easy to apply, the
notion of reattribution increases their complexity. 68 Reattribution often
will not apply; however, stock attributed by an entity to one holding a
beneficial interest in the entity may be reattributed from the beneficial in-
terest holder to members of his family. Conversely, stock attributed from
63. Id. § 318(a)(3)(B)(i). This section provides that a contingent interest is considered
remote if, in the trustee's discretion, the value of the interest, computed actuarily, is five
percent or less of the value of the trust property. Id
64. Id. § 318(a)(5)(C).
65. Id § 318(a)(4).
66. Id § 318(a)(5)(D).
67. Id § 318(a)(5)(A).
68. The following examples illustrate the complexity involved in applying the attribu-
tion rules:
[(I)] X Corporation's 100 shares of stock are owned as follows: Twenty
shares by A, B, and C, who are brothers, and forty shares by a trust, in which
the interests of A, B, and C, computed actuarily, are 50 percent, 20 percent,
and 30 percent, respectively. The trust is considered to own all of the stock in
X, whereas A, B, and C, in addition to the 20 shares each owns directly, own
20, 8, and 12 shares constructively, respectively.
If C's interest in the trust were both "remote" (i.e., worth 5 percent or less)
and contingent, his stock would not be attributed to the trust, but its stock
would be attributed proportionately to him.
B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 50, 9.21, at 9-17.
Under section 318(a)(3)(B), all stock owned indirectly by a trust beneficiary will be attrib-
uted to the trust unless the value of the beneficiary's interest, actuarily computed, is worth
5% or less of the trust's property. Thus, in the above example all of the shares owned by A,
B, and C must be attributed to the trust, creating the 100% ownership.
[(2)] X Corporation's 100 shares are owned 30 shares by W, 20 shares by S
(the son of W), and 50 shares by E, an estate (W is the life beneficiary of the
property being administered by the estate, and S the remainderman). E owns
100 shares of X, 30 of which are attributed from W, and 20 from S to W (by
family attribution) and thence from W to E (by beneficiary to estate attribu-
tion). W also owns 100 shares of X (all of the estate's 50 shares, since W,
rather than S, is considered as the sole beneficiary since she has the direct
present interest in estate assets or income) and 20 from S by family attribution.
S likewise owns 100 shares of X (30 from W, and 50 from E to W to S).
If S and W were unrelated, however, the estate would own only 80 shares of
X (those owned directly, plus those attributed from W, S not being a benefici-
ary), as would W; S would own only 20 shares, the amount owned directly,
since he is not a beneficiary of the estate in view of his "future" interest.
Id. 9.21, at 9-17 to -18.
The above example demonstrates the effect of reattribution in determining the stock own-
ership of both an individual and entity.
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one family member to another may be reattributed to an entity.69 As a
result of these reattribution rules, a stock redemption might not qualify for
exchange treatment under the strict tests of section 302(b).
The ramifications of an entity's ability to waive these attribution rules
thus can be important. If a trust or estate is allowed to waive the family
attribution rules under section 302(c)(2), a more beneficial tax treatment
will be afforded a stock redemption. 70 If family hostility exists, it might be
a fact or circumstance that allows a stock redemption to be treated as not
essentially equivalent to a dividend, thus affording it exchange
treatment.
7
B. Legislative History of Section 302
A review of the legislative history of section 302 is necessary to under-
stand recent judicial decisions involving the tax treatment of stock re-
demptions. As evidenced by this legislative history, stock redemption
complications are not new problems. Congress, in an attempt to prevent
abusive distributions of corporate earnings, first established rules gov-
erning the tax treatment of stock redemptions in 1921.72
Congress enacted these rules in response to a 1920 Supreme Court case,
Eisner v. Macomber.73 Prior to this decision, shareholders were taxed im-
mediately upon receipt of a stock dividend.74 The Supreme Court con-
cluded in Eisner, however, that the receipt of a stock dividend by a
shareholder was not in itself a taxable event. 75 The court reasoned that a
stock dividend neither took anything away from a corporation's property
nor added to a shareholder's property.76 The shareholders, therefore, had
not received any taxable income within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment. 77 This holding made it possible for a corporation with accu-
mulated earnings to issue a stock dividend to a shareholder and then re-
deem the shares for cash. The shareholder could thus avoid the ordinary
tax rate treatment applicable to cash dividends and treat the transaction as
a stock redemption that qualified for the capital gain tax rates.
Congress, recognizing this possibility of abuse, enacted section 201(d) of
the Revenue Act of 1921, which provided that a stock redemption pre-
ceded by a stock dividend could be taxed as a dividend if the transaction
69. I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(A) (1982).
70. See infra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955); infra notes 97-138 and accompanying text.
72. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 227 (amended 1924) (current ver-
sion at I.R.C. §§ 302, 305 (1982)).
73. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
74. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (repealed 1921) (current ver-
sion at I.R.C. § 305 (1982)).
75. 252 U.S. at 211-12.
76. Id
77. Id at 212. The sixteenth amendment states that "[tihe Congress shall have power to
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI.
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was essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend. 78 Only
redemptions that occurred after a stock dividend were subject to this divi-
dend equivalence test under section 201(d). Shareholders could, therefore,
first redeem shares for cash to be taxed at capital gain rates and then have
the corporation issue a stock dividend equal to the number of shares re-
deemed. Through this reversal of the stock dividend and redemption,
shareholders avoided the consequences of section 201(d). This abuse was
corrected in 1924 when Congress enacted section 201(f) of the Revenue
Act of 1924. 79 Section 201(f) provided that a stock redemption could be
treated as a dividend regardless of whether the transaction occurred before
or after a stock dividend.
Two years later Congress again amended this provision by including
section 201(g). 80 Under this section the question of whether a stock re-
demption preceded or followed a stock dividend was irrelevant. Whenever
a stock redemption occurred it was to be treated as a taxable dividend if
the redemption was essentially equivalent to such a dividend. 8' This pro-
vision removed any possibility for manipulative timing of stock dividends
and redemptions to obtain more favorable tax treatment.
Section 201(f) was ultimately reenacted as section 115(g) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.82 Since no objective standards were presented in
the Code to determine whether a redemption was essentially equivalent to
a dividend under section 115(g), courts created their own vague standards.
Each case involving the tax treatment of a stock redemption required a
court to inquire into the characteristics of the distribution to determine
78. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 227 (amended 1924) (current ver-
sion at I.R.C. §§ 302, 305 (1982)) stated:
A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if after the distribution of any
such dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such
time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or re-
demption essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the
amount received in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be treated as
a taxable dividend to the extent of the earnings or profits accumulated by such
corporation ....
79. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(0, 43 Stat. 253 (amended 1926) (current version
at I.R.C. §§ 302, 305 (1982)) stated:
A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax, but if before or after the distribu-
tion of any such dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem its
stock at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancel-
lation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribu-
tion of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed. . . shall be treated as a
taxable dividend.
(Emphasis added.)
80. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11 (current version at I.R.C. § 302
(1982)).
81. Id.
82. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 302 (1982)) provided:
If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was
issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make the
distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed




whether it more closely approximated a dividend or an exchange of
stock.83 The characteristics upon which the courts based their decisions
included: (1) whether a sufficient surplus had accumulated to fund a dis-
tribution;84 (2) whether the redemption was made for a legitimate business
purpose;8 5 (3) whether the corporation had routinely paid dividends;8 6
(4) whether the corporation or the shareholders initiated the redemption;8 7
(5) whether the redemption was a pro rata distribution;88 and (6) whether
the redemption materially altered the corporate ownership.89 Because
courts considered so many different characteristics to be significant in de-
termining the tax treatment of stock redemptions, divergent case law de-
veloped and section 115(g) could not be relied on in shareholder tax
planning.
This situation provided the background for the congressional enactment
of section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. To eliminate the
discord caused by prior statutes, the House of Representatives proposed
two objective standards under which stock redemptions would be taxed at
capital gain rates.90 The House expressly noted that its rationale for this
new approach was to eliminate the factual inquiry needed in every stock
83. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); McGuire v.
Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431, 432-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 591 (1936).
84. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1941); Flanagan v. Helvering, 116
F.2d 937, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Brown v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1935); Hill v.
Commissioner, 66 F.2d 45, 47 (4th Cir. 1933).
85. Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1935); Commissioner v.
Champion, 78 F.2d 513, 514-15 (6th Cir. 1935); Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304, 305-
07 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 571 (1934); L.M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436, 440-42 (1947);
Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120, 1127-28 (1945); H.F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878, 883-84
(1937); Alfred E. Fuhlage, 32 B.T.A. 222, 227-29 (1935); see also Bittker & Redlich, Corpo-
rate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAX L. REV. 437, 468 (1950) (existence of legitimate
business purpose termed the most important standard used by the courts to determine divi-
dend equivalence under § 115(g) of the 1939 Code).
86. Some courts have concluded that where a corporation with a poor dividend history
suddenly redeems stock, this transaction in reality is a concealed dividend. Goldstein v.
Commissioner, 113 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1940); E.M. Peet, 43 B.T.A. 852, 858-59 (1941); J.
Natwick, 36 B.T.A 866, 875-77 (1937). Contra Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836, 840-41 (1948).
87. Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Robinson v. Commis-
sioner, 69 F.2d 972, 973 (5th Cir. 1934); R.W. Creech, 46 B.T.A. 93, 103 (1942).
88. Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Bona Allen, Jr., 41
B.T.A. 206, 210-11 (1940).
89. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1941); Flanagan v. Helvering, 116
F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866, 876 (1937).
90. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4025, 4060-61 states:
In general, because of the considerable confusion which exists in this area,
taxpayers have been faced with potential dividend-tax liability in many cases
where such result is unwarranted, and in other cases have avoided such liabil-
ity where the redemption was the equivalent of a dividend.
Your committee's bill sets forth definite conditions under which stock may
be redeemed at capital-gain rates. . . . [Y]our committee has defined when a
substantially disproportionate redemption of a shareholder's stock will qualify
so as not to be taxable as a dividend; namely, that a particular shareholder's
holdings of participating stock after the distribution be less than 80 percent of
his holdings before the distribution.
A distribution in complete redemption of a shareholder's stock will also re-
sult in a capital gain.
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redemption case to determine if the redemption was not essentially
equivalent to a dividend under section 115(g). 91 These House proposals
became the current substantially disproportionate test under section
302(b)(2) and the complete termination test under section 302(b)(3). The
House also noted the opportunity for tax avoidance in redemptions involv-
ing family owned corporations. To prevent this possible abuse and to pro-
vide guidance in tax planning, the House version of section 302 provided
that the attribution rules should be applied when determining the tax treat-
ment afforded stock redemptions. 92
The Senate left the section 302 provisions adopted by the House intact,
but reenacted the language of section 115(g) that allowed exchange treat-
ment for stock redemptions not essentially equivalent to a dividend. The
purpose of this reinstatement was to ameliorate the restrictiveness of the
House's definite criteria, which could create inequities.93 The Senate also
indicated that a factual inquiry like that employed under section 115(g)
was still to be applied under the standard that is currently section
302(b)(1). 94 The House proposals along with the Senate amendment be-
came section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This section,
which was to have added certainty to the tax laws and eliminated confu-
sion among courts and taxpayers, only created additional controversy.
II. FAMILY HOSTILITY AND SECTION 302
A. Early Judicial Developments
Code sections 302 and 318 provide no guidelines for determining what
effect the presence of family hostility should have on the tax treatment of
stock redemptions. Section 302(c) requires that the attribution rules must
91. Id. at A72-73, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4210.
92. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
93. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4629, 4675 states:
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock may be
redeemed at capital-gain rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily restrictive,
particularly, in the case of redemptions of preferred stock which might be
called by the corporation without the shareholder having any control over
when the redemption may take place. Accordingly, your committee follows
existing law by reinserting the general language indicating that a redemption
shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for stock
if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
94. Id at 233-34, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4629, 4870 states:
In lieu of the approach in the House bill, your committee intends to revert in
part to existing law by making the determination of whether a redemption is
taxable as a sale at capital gains rates or as a dividend at ordinary income
rates dependent, except where it is specifically provided otherwise, upon a fac-
tual inquiry.
. . . In general, under this subsection your committee intends to incorporate
into the bill existing law as to whether or not a reduction is essentially
equivalent to a dividend under section 115(g)(l) of the 1939 Code. . ..
. . . The test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of [section




be applied to all stock redemptions. 95 On the other hand, though, the
determination of whether a stock redemption is not essentially equivalent
to a dividend under section 302(b)(1) requires that a factual inquiry be
employed. 96 The application of the attribution rules to stock redemptions
when family hostility exists has been addressed in several recent judicial
decisions.
This controversy was first recognized in a 1961 Tax Court case, Estate of
Squier v. Commissioner.97 The decedent, Squier, directly owned 50.09% of
the stock of Squier, Schilling, and Skiff, Inc., and had an additional 13.2 1%
through attribution from his wife and grandchild. After Squier's death,
friction developed between the chief trust officer of the bank handling his
estate and family members.98 Squier's executor elected to exercise an op-
tion to redeem a portion of Squier's stock. After the redemption the estate
owned 41.27% of the corporation's stock directly and 15.55% through attri-
bution from the hostile family members who were the estate's benefi-
ciaries. The executor claimed that the redemption was not essentially
equivalent to a dividend and should qualify for capital gain treatment.
The IRS argued that the distribution should be taxed as a dividend.
In its holding the tax court first recognized that hostility existed between
the executor and the family members who owned the corporation's stock. 99
Thus, despite the attribution rules, the redemption did actually result in a
reduction of the estate's control over the corporation. Taking these facts
into account, the court concluded that even after applying the attribution
rules, the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.' °
Later in the same year that Squier was decided, the Tax Court decided
Parker v. Commissioner,101 another case involving the family hostility is-
sue. In Parker differences of opinion arose between a father and his son
concerning the corporation in which they were majority shareholders. The
father owned 49.7% of the corporation's stock and the son owned 47.4%.
As a result of their differences, the father agreed to redeem a portion of his
shares so that his son could obtain control of the corporation. Although
the father treated this redemption as an exchange under section 302(b)(1),
the IRS disagreed, contending that the attribution rules required the re-
demption to be taxed as a dividend. The Tax Court noted, as it had in
Squier, that substantial controversy regarding the company's operation ex-
95. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1) (1982).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1960); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233-34,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4629, 4870.
97. 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted 1978-
2 C.B. 4, 5.
98. The trust officer was elected to serve in Squier's place on the corporation's board of
directors. Later Squier's widow demanded that this officer, acting as the estate's executor
with a majority interest in the corporation, name her son-in-law as the new corporation
president. The bank officer refused to accede to this demand.
99. 35 T.C. at 955-56.
100. Id at 956.
101. 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893 (1961).
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isted between Parker and his son prior to the redemption.10 2 The result of
the redemption, then, was to transfer effective control of the corporation
from one family member to another.10 3 After reviewing all the facts, in-
cluding the family relationship involved and the history of continuing dis-
agreement, the court ruled that the redemption should be afforded capital
gain treatment.1 4 The IRS acquiesced in the Tax Court's position in
Squier, 105 and the issue of how the presence of family hostility should af-
fect stock redemptions appeared to be decided.
The family hostility issue arose again in the 1970 Supreme Court deci-
sion in United States v. Davis.'0 6 Although family discord was not actually
present in Davis, the decision had important implications for determining
whether a redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. In
1945 Davis and an unrelated person formed a corporation in which he and
his wife each owned twenty-five percent of the common stock. Subse-
quently, Davis contributed an additional $25,000 to the corporation in re-
turn for 1000 shares of preferred stock. The.purpose of this transaction
was to increase the company's working capital to enable the company to
qualify for a loan. The corporation was to redeem the preferred stock
when the loan was repaid. Meanwhile, Davis purchased all of the unre-
lated stockholder's shares and divided them between his son and daughter.
In 1963 the loan was fully repaid, and the company redeemed the pre-
ferred stock for $25,000. Davis treated the redemption as a capital gain
transaction for which he recognized no income in his 1963 tax return. The
IRS, however, contended that the redemption was essentially equivalent to
a dividend and, thus, taxable as ordinary income.
Davis first argued that the attribution rules in section 318(a) did not
apply when considering whether a redemption is essentially equivalent to a
dividend. The Court concluded, however, that the plain language in sec-
tion 302(c) indicated that the attribution rules were applicable in determin-
ing stock ownership for purposes of that section. 0 7 In support of its
position, the Court noted that courts of appeals' decisions, 0 8 Treasury
Regulations, 0 9 opinions of leading commentators, 0 and the legislative
history of section 302 all concurred with this view."'
102. Id. at 900.
103. Id at 899-900.
104. Id at 901.
105. 1961-2 C.B. 5. IRS policy is to announce in the Internal Revenue Bulletin whether
the Commissioner will acquiesce or not acquiesce in a Tax Court decision that disallows a
tax deficiency determined to be due by the IRS. An acquiescence in a decision means that
the IRS accepts the conclusion reached, but does not necessarily approve of the reasons
given by the court for its conclusion. 1982-2 C.B. 1.
106. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
107. Id at 306-07.
108. Id at 306 (citing Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1967); Com-
missioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 342 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v. United States, 301
F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1962); Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 116-17 (1st Cir.
1962)).
109. 397 U.S. at 306 (citing Treas. Reg. 1.302-2(b) (1960)).
110. 397 U.S. at 306 (citing B. BrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 50, at 292 n.32).
111. 397 U.S. at 306-07.
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Davis further argued that even if the attribution rules were applicable to
redemptions under section 302(b)(1), this redemption was still not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend. The Court again rejected Davis's argu-
ment, holding that the motivation for the redemption should be
disregarded when applying the dividend equivalency test." 2 The Court
concluded that for a redemption to qualify for exchange treatment under
section 302(b)(1), it must represent "a meaningful reduction of a share-
holder's proportionate interest in the corporation." "13 The effect of the Da-
vis holding on the family hostility issue was unclear from the outset.
Although the Court clearly stated that the attribution rules must be ap-
plied in all stock redemptions, the Court failed to address the question of
how to determine a meaningful reduction of a shareholder's interest after
application of the attribution rules.
B. Aftermath of United States v. Davis
Subsequent to the Davis decision, the IRS developed a new administra-
tive stance toward stock redemptions and family hostility, evidenced by
both its withdrawal of the earlier acquiesence to the Squier decision and its
replacement with a nonacquiescence.' "4 The IRS finally instituted a rigid,
mechanical approach towards the application of family attribution rules to
stock redemptions." 15 The courts, on the other hand, did not directly ad-
dress the family hostility issue immediately following Davis. Support for
the position that the existence of family hostility still did mitigate the effect
of the attribution rules on stock redemptions, however, appeared in Title
Insurance & Trust Co. v. United States.116 In that case the court noted that
the assumption of family unity integral to the attribution rules may "prove
awkward or unfair in cases where families do not behave as the rules as-
sume they will, and inter-family disputes exist as to who should control
and how."' 17 Family hostility was not present in this case, however, so the
statement was a mere dictum.
The first chance after Davis for a definite holding by the courts on the
family hostility argument came in a First Circuit case, Haft Trust v. Com-
missioner. "18 The case involved four trusts created by a grandfather for
112. Id. at 312-13.
113. ld at 313.
114. 1978-2 C.B. 4, 5.
115. See Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66.
116. 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973); see also B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 50,
9.24, at 9-33 n.73 ("The Davis decision ...weakens, but does not eliminate, the 'family
fight' argument in mitigation of § 318 attribution under § 302(b)(1) ...."); Boyd & Boyd,
Family Discord May Negate Attribution Rules and Allow Capital Gain Treatment of a Re-
demption, 15 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 362, 364 (1975) (a meaningful reduction of interest occurs
when a substantial family controversy eliminates control that redeeming shareholders have
over other family shareholders); Comment, Defining Dividend Equivalency under Section
302(b)(1), 16 VILL. L. REV. 88, 104 (1970) (circumstances surrounding redemption should be
examined to determine whether family relationship has deteriorated such that attribution is
a fiction, thereby creating meaningful reduction of shareholder's interest.).
117. 484 F.2d at 465 n.4.
118. 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
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each of his four grandchildren. The grandfather transferred into each of
the trusts 25,000 shares of Haft-Gaines Corporation stock. After a bitter
divorce the parents decided to terminate the trusts' financial involvement
in the corporation and the trusts' stockholdings were redeemed by the cor-
poration. After applying the attribution rules, each trust owned thirty-one
and two-thirds percent of the corporation's stock prior to the redemption
and thirty-three and one-third percent after the redemption. 19 This
unique situation indicated no significant shift in control of the corporation,
although the trusts no longer actually owned any stock. In their 1967 fed-
eral income tax returns, the trusts treated the proceeds from the stock re-
demption as a long-term capital gain. If the attribution rules were
mechanically applied, however, as the IRS argued, the redemption would
be considered essentially equivalent to a dividend and taxable as ordinary
income. The issue before the court was thus whether, after United States v.
Davis, the presence of family hostility mitigated the application of the con-
structive ownership rules of Code section 318 in determining dividend
equivalence under section 302(b)(1). 120
Relying on the statement in Davis that section 302(b)(1) requires a
meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the
corporation,' 2' the court held that the language permitted, if not man-
dated, an examination of the facts and circumstances of a stock redemp-
tion, rather than a mechanical application of the attribution rules.122 In a
futile attempt to support its purely objective test, however, the IRS argued
that a judicial inquiry into the presence of family hostility would lead to a
legal quagmire.' 23 The court responded that in retaining section 302(b)(1)
in the Code, Congress was willing to tolerate some administrative incon-
venience for the sake of equity. 124 The court concluded, therefore, that the
effect of family attribution rules could be mitigated in determining divi-
dend equivalence, depending on the facts and circumstances of a stock
redemption.' 25 The case was then remanded to the Tax Court for a con-
sideration of the effects of family hostility in negating the presumption that
the trusts would continue to exert control over the corporation. 26 Before
the Tax Court could receive the case, however, it was settled out of court.
As a result, Haft Trust could not be relied on as a clear precedent that the
attribution rules should be mitigated by family hostility.' 27
Despite the Haft Trust decision, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 80-
26,128 which directly conflicted with the holding. On facts identical to
119. See id at 46 n.2 for explanation of this result.
120. Id. at 44-45.
121. Davis, 397 U.S. at 313.





127. See Englebrecht & DeCelles, Family Discord and Section 302 Stock Redemptions: A
Review andAnalysis, 58 TAXES 43, 49 (1980).
128. Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66.
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those in Haft Trust the IRS held that the facts and circumstances of a
particular stock redemption could not contradict the mechanical applica-
tion of the attribution rules in determining the amount of stock that a
shareholder owned. 129 This series of holdings thus set the stage for a defi-
nite decision on the family hostility issue, and the recent Fifth Circuit case
Metzger Trust v. Commissioner' 30 provided the opportunity.
In Metzger Trust David Metzger created a trust with his wife as a life
beneficiary and his three children, Jacob, Catherine, and Cecelia, as hold-
ers of one-third remainder interests. Four years later David incorporated
the family business as Metzger Dairies, Inc., and the trust became a share-
holder. When David died in 1953, Jacob assumed control of the corpora-
tion, and his two sisters became corporate directors. During the 1960s
corporate earnings declined and dividends were not distributed. As a re-
sult, quarreling among the siblings escalated into open animosity. Dis-
agreements arose over the management of the corporation and other issues
unrelated to business. This hostility continued to a point of such discord
that finally in 1972 Jacob, Catherine, and Cecelia concluded that their
joint ownership in the corporation must terminate. The siblings decided
that the corporation would redeem the stock directly owned by Catherine
and Cecelia and the stock owned by the trust in which they held a benefi-
cial interest. Prior to the redemption, the trust, after applying the attribu-
tion rules, owned 100% of the corporation's stock. After the redemption,
the trust still constructively owned 100% of the stock, although Catherine
and Cecelia no longer had any ownership interest in the corporation.
The trust treated the proceeds from the stock redemption as a capital
gain on its 1973 tax return, and the IRS assessed a deficiency, claiming that
the proceeds were essentially equivalent to a dividend and taxable at ordi-
nary income rates. The issues before the court included the question of
whether the section 318 attribution rules must be applied when family dis-
cord is present in determining whether a redemption is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend.'31 In response to the trust's first argument that
the attribution rules were inapplicable since the family could not function
as an economic unit, the court held that in view of the Davis decision the
attribution rules may not be treated as a rebuttable presumption, but must
be applied in all stock redemptions when determining dividend equiva-
lence. 32 Relying on Haft Trust, the trust next argued that although 100%
stock ownership was attributed to it before and after the redemption, the
redemption was still not essentially equivalent to a dividend because of the
129. Id. at 67. The IRS concluded that it would not follow the First Circuit's decision in
Haft Trust. Id
130. 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1388 (1983).
131. 693 F.2d at 460. Other issues before the court were whether a trust may waive the
attribution rules by filing a waiver agreement and whether the § 267(c) attribution rules
must be applied to interest payments between hostile family members. Id The latter issue
was before the court because of an appeal by the corporation and is unrelated to the family
hostility issues discussed in this Comment.
132. Id. at 463-64.
19841
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
family hostility present.1 33 The court stated that even though some com-
mentators and courts indicated that Davis did not foreclose arguments for
capital gain treatment based on family hostility,1 34 their interpretations
were not persuasive.1 35 Convinced by the Davis court's observation that
Congress designed the attribution rules to provide a clear answer to what
would otherwise be a difficult tax question, the court concluded that the
attribution rules could not be mitigated. 36 Thus, family discord should
not be taken into account, but rather an inquiry into only the structure of
the stockholdings should be made to determine whether a meaningful re-
duction has occurred in the shareholder's proportionate interest. 137 If after
applying the attribution rules the resulting corporate structure has virtually
the same incidents of ownership as before the redemption, the redemption
proceeds must be essentially equivalent to a dividend. 38
The Metzger Trust decision represents an abrupt shift in the judicial in-
terpretation of the family hostility issue. Even though Davis may have
weakened previous court decisions, no court before Metzger had specifi-
cally held that the presence of family hostility would not mitigate the ap-
plication of the attribution rules in stock redemptions. Unfortunately the
only conclusion that can be drawn from these conflicting judicial opinions
is that the confusion surrounding the dividend equivalence test under sec-
tion 302(b)(1) has yet to be eliminated. Instead, further judicial inquiry
into the family hostility issue and the effect of the Davis decision is
necessary.
III. ENTITY WAIVER OF FAMILY ATTRIBUTION RULES
A. Extension of Waiver Beyond Individuals
Closely related to the family hostility issue is the question of whether the
statutory waiver of the attribution rules under section 302(c)(2) may be
extended to trusts and estates. As is evident by the foregoing discussion of
the family hostility issue, a judicial controversy has arisen only when the
IRS questioned the tax treatment afforded a stock redemption by an estate
or trust. If the requirements for a waiver under section 302(c)(2) can be
met, a family dispute could be settled through a stock redemption that
terminates the shareholder's interest in the corporation. The shareholder
need not qualify for exchange treatment under the dividend equivalence
test of section 302(b)(1). Instead, under section 302(b)(3) the proceeds
would be taxed at capital gain rates.' 39 When the redeeming shareholder
133. Id. at 463.
134. Id at 465-66 (citing Robin Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir.
1975); B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 50, 9.24, at n.73; O'Dell & Boyd, Family
Hostility and Stock Redemptions: Revenue Ruling 80-26 Revives the Controversy, 59 TAXES
153, 156-60 (1981)).
135. 693 F.2d at 466.
136. Id
137. Id at 467-68.
138. Id
139. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
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is an individual, this settlement creates no tax problems. When the re-
deeming shareholder is a trust or estate, however, the tax treatment af-
forded the redemption is a subject of controversy.
The IRS has continually maintained that section 302(c)(2) applies only
to redemptions from individuals. Revenue Ruling 59-233 presented the
IRS's initial attack on an entity's right to avail itself of the statutory
waiver. 140 This ruling involved a corporation owned jointly by an individ-
ual and a trust created for the benefit of the individual's children. The
trust redeemed its stock and attempted to qualify for exchange treatment
under section 302(b)(3) by filing the statutory waiver under section
302(c)(2).141 The purpose of the filing was to waive the family attribution
from the father to his children. 142 If this waiver was deemed ineffective,
the shares attributed to the children could be reattributed to the trust
under section 318(a)(2), 143 rendering section 302(b)(3) inapplicable. The
IRS denied the trust this privilege, noting that the legislative history of
section 302(c)(2) clearly limited the waiver of family attribution rules to a
distributee who would be considered to own stock subsequent to the re-
demption only by application of section 318(a)(1).144 Since section
318(a)(1) covers only family members, the IRS concluded, a trust was inel-
igible to file the statutory waiver. 45 The IRS reiterated this conclusion
and extended it to estates in Revenue Ruling 68-388.146
In 1973 the Tax Court in Crawford v. Commissioner147 rejected the IRS's
position that a "distributee" under section 302(c)(2) meant only an individ-
ual and not an entity. The corporation in Crawford was owned by an es-
tate, the decedent's wife, who was also the estate's sole beneficiary, and her
two sons. The estate and Mrs. Crawford, pursuant to a stock purchase
agreement, concurrently redeemed all of their stock and filed waiver agree-
ments. The IRS maintained, as in their prior revenue rulings, that subse-
quent to the redemption the estate still constructively owned 100% of the
stock and, not being an individual, could not waive the family attribution
140. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106.
141. Id. at 106.
142. See supra notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text. Section 302(c)(2) allows only the
distributee to file a waiver of the family attribution rules. Thus, since the trust alone was a
distributee in the redemption, only the trust, and not its beneficiaries, could even attempt to
qualify for the statutory waiver. See I.R.C. § 302(c)(2) (1982).
143. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
144. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. at 107.
145. Id
146. Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 C.B. 122. This ruling involved a corporation owned
jointly by an individual and an estate whose sole beneficiary was the individual's mother.
To avoid the problem encountered in Revenue Ruling 59-233, the estate proposed first to
transfer its stock to the mother, who would then pay for the stock with the proceeds from a
simultaneous redemption by the corporation. The IRS labeled this proposal as transitory
and without economic substance, saying that in reality the corporation would be redeeming
stock from the estate. Id at 122. Thus a waiver filed by the mother would be ineffective,
because Revenue Ruling 59-233 had established that only a distributee who was an individ-
ual could file a waiver.
147. 59 T.C. 830, 834 (1973), nonacq. 1974-2 C.B. 5.
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rules. The proceeds received by the estate would, therefore, be taxed as a
dividend.
The court, however, disagreed with the IRS, noting that in drafting sec-
tion 302(c)(2), Congress scrupulously avoided the use of terms referring
specifically to a person.' 48 The court concluded that Congress's choice of
the word "distributee" throughout section 302(c)(2) was not inadvertent,
but rather was intended to avoid limitation of the statutory waiver to indi-
viduals. 49 In response to this conclusion, the IRS contended that permit-
ting an estate to avail itself of the waiver provision would lead to abuses,
because the waiver filed by an estate would not prevent the beneficiaries
from acquiring an interest in the distributing corporation within ten years
after the redemption. The court conceded that this potential for abuse did
exist, but stated that the remedy proposed by the IRS would lead to a
nonsensical result.' 50 This concession by the court was actually unneces-
sary. Under section 318(a)(3)(A), a reacquisition by an estate beneficiary
would constitute a prohibited reacquisition by the estate, and the benefici-
ary would, in effect, be bound by the terms of the estate's waiver.' 5' This
principle was approved by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 71-562.152
The Crawford rationale was extended to trusts in a subsequent Tax
Court case, Rodgers P. Johnson Trust. 153 In Johnson Trust a decedent's
trust owned approximately five percent of a corporation's stock. The dece-
dent's son, who had a 96.14% actuarial interest in the trust, owned no
stock. His mother owned approximately forty percent of the corporation's
stock, but her actuarial interest in the trust was not sufficient under section
318(a)(3)(B)(i) to directly attribute her stock to the trust.' 54 The mother's
shares were attributed through her son to the trust, and the trust redeemed
its stock and filed the statutory waiver of the family attribution rules under
section 302(c)(2). The case centered on whether the trust was eligible to
file a waiver that cut out the attribution between the mother and son.' 55 In
addition to concluding that Congress did not intend waivers to be filed
only by family members, 156 the court explained that adverse consequences
could result from a restrictive interpretation of the term "distributee" when
a trust held non-income-producing, closely held stock that the trustee
wished to replace with income-producing assets.157 Unless the attribution
rules could be waived to allow a redemption in which the proceeds could
be used to acquire productive assets, the court concluded, the trustee might
148. 59 T.C. at 834.
149. Id at 836.
150. Id
151. McCaffrey, supra note 54, 1206.3, at 12-34.
152. See Rev. Rul. 71-562, 1971-2 C.B. 173.
153. 71 T.C. 941 (1979).
154. See supra note 63.
155. 71 T.C. at 948.
156. Id. at 950-5 1. The court focused again on Congress's use of "distributee," rather
than "person," in the statute. See I.R.C. § 302(c)(2) (1982).
157. 71 T.C. at 954.
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have to retain the nonproductive stock.158
B. Extension of Waiver Beyond Family Attribution Rules
A 1979 Fifth Circuit case, Rickey v. United States,159 extended the Tax
Court's holdings in Crawford and Johnson Trust. In Rickey an estate
owned approximately fifty-seven percent of the corporation's stock prior to
the redemption. The decedent's three children, who were the estate's only
beneficiaries, owned approximately thirty-four percent of the corporation's
stock. Under the terms of the decedent's will all of the estate's stock was
required to be redeemed by the corporation, pursuant to a purchase agree-
ment. In an attempt to qualify for exchange treatment under section
302(b)(3), the estate filed a waiver agreement.
The situation in Rickey was unlike that in both Crawford and Johnson
Trust. In the latter cases the purpose of filing was to avoid the family
attribution rules. The specific terms of section 302(c)(2) allow a distributee
to waive these rules only as outlined in section 318(a)(1). In Rickey, how-
ever, the estate filed the waiver to avoid the entity attribution rules under
section 318(a)(3). 160 In Crawford and Johnson Trust neither the entities
nor their beneficiaries still directly owned stock in the corporation after the
redemption, but in Rickey the estate beneficiaries still owned a thirty-four
percent interest in the corporation.
While acknowledging this situation, the court rejected a "slavish" inter-
pretation of the Code in order to obtain results more in line with the con-
gressional intent in enacting the attribution and waiver sections of the
Code. 16 The court stated that the Code should not be given a "crabbed
reading" when, because the rationale behind a section is absent, applying
the section leads to unnecessarily harsh results. 62 Instead, the court was
convinced that Congress intended enforcement of the Code to be accom-
panied by common sense and basic principles of fairness. 163 Thus the
court concluded that an estate could waive the entity attribution rules of
section 318(a)(3) to qualify for exchange treatment under section302(b)(3).1 64
The Rickey decision has received much criticism, 65 primarily because
158. Id
159. 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
160. Id at 1258.
161. Id at 1257-58.
162. Id. at 1258.
163. Id.
164. Id
165. See, e.g., Karzon, No Smooth Sailingfor Fiduciaries Waiving Attribution in Stock
Redemptions, 59 TAXES 3, 6 (1981); Phillips & Kelly, Waiver ofAttribution Rules in Internal
Revenue Code Section 302 Redemptions from Estates, 5 J. CORP. L. 241, 255-59 (1980); Wil-
lens, Recent Decisions Open the Wayfor Trusts and Estates to Waive Stock Attribution, 51 J.
TAX'N 208, 210 (1979); Comment, Estate Waiver f the Estate-Benefciary Attribution Rule in
Nonliquidating Redemptions under Section 302 and Related Matters." The Rickey Case in the
Ffth Circuit, 55 TAx L. REV. 147, 162-63 (1979); Comment, Stock Redemptions and the
state Attribution Rules, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 650, 666-69 (1980).
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the decision allegedly contradicts the plain language of section 302(c)(2) 66
and because no administrative or judicial foundation exists to support the
conclusion. 167 Rickey, however, could be considered a logical extension of
the judicial trend, as seen progressively in Squier, Haft Trust, Crawford,
and Johnson Trust, to examine the congressional intent in enacting the at-
tribution rules and to disregard these rules when their mechanical applica-
tion produces inequitable results. The courts have seemed willing, when
family hostility was present and a trust or estate was the redeeming share-
holder, to allow the redemption to qualify for capital gain treatment under
section 301(b)(3) upon the filing of a waiver under section 302(c)(2), even
though the IRS has consistently objected.
One question remained open after Rickey: whether the holding would
be extended to trusts, so that trusts involved in a redemption also could
waive the entity attribution rules to resolve family discord and thereby
qualify for capital gain treatment. This issue was addressed by the court in
Metzger Trust v. Commissioner. 168 The trust in Metzger Trust maintained
that, in light of the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision in Rickey, the waiver it
filed was also effective to waive the trust-beneficiary attribution rules of
section 318(a)(3). Without the waiver, 100% stock ownership was attrib-
uted to the trust through its beneficiary, Jacob, even though Jacob's sisters,
who were involved in the family dispute, no longer owned any stock. 169
The court disagreed with the trust's argument, noting that it was not obli-
gated to extend the Rickey decision and that sufficient differences existed
between a waiver by an estate and a waiver by a trust to justify different
rules.170 The court reasoned that section 302(c)(2) was designed to permit
one family member to turn control of a close corporation over to another
family member and receive capital gain treatment only once in a ten-year
period.' 7' Allowing the transfer of control to occur through an estate after
the first family member's death was, the court stated, consistent with this
rationale. Conversely, the court concluded that permitting a waiver by
trusts would run contrary to the purpose of section 302(c)(2).' 72 Since
trusts are artificial entities and any number of them can be created, if a
trust could waive the entity attribution rules, nothing could prevent the
beneficiaries or a new trust with the same beneficiaries from acquiring the
same interest in the corporation. 7 3 Although the parties stipulated that the
redemption was motivated by a desire to settle a family dispute and not to
avoid taxes, the court held that this motive did not guarantee that the par-
166. Willens, supra note 165, at 210.
167. Karzon, supra note 165, at 6.
168. 693 F.2d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1388
(1983). The first question covered in Metzger Trust was the family hostility issue, which is
discussed supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of the facts of Metzger Trust, see supra text accompanying notes
130 & 131.






ties who had their stock redeemed would not reacquire an interest in the
corporation at a later date. 174 The court therefore concluded that a trust
may not file an effective waiver agreement under section 302(c)(2).1 75
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Metzger Trust regarding trust waivers, as
with the court's ruling regarding the family hostility issue, represents a
sudden shift in the previous judicial trend expanding the scope of section
302(c). The Metzger Trust decision signals a warning by the courts that
future controversies involving family hostility and entity waiver may be
decided in accordance with the IRS's position. 176 Without further legisla-
tive action, taxpayer planning in stock redemptions will remain in a con-
fused state and the litigation of these redemptions will continue.
IV. TEFRA IMPLICATIONS FOR STOCK REDEMPTIONS
Congress, aware of the conflicting positions of the courts and the IRS,
passed TEFRA section 228 a few months before the Metzger Trust deci-
sion. 177 This section amended Code section 302(c)(2). Although this
amendment was passed prior to Metzger Trust, the court was unable to
apply the new law in Metzger Trust since the redemption involved in the
controversy occurred prior to the passage of TEFRA. 178
Under amended section 302(c)(2) an entity is allowed to waive the fam-
ily attribution rules of section 318(a)(1), provided that the entity and each
related person meets the requirements specified in section
302(c)(2)(C)(i)(I), which provides that no interest in the corporation may
be acquired within ten years after the redemption. 79 For purposes of the
section, "entity" includes estates, trusts, partnerships, and corporations. 80
A "related person" means any person to whom a corporation's stock is
attributed under section 318(a)(1), if that stock can be further attributed to
the entity under section 318(a)(3).' 8 1 Each related person must agree to be
held equally liable along with other related persons for any deficiency re-
sulting from an acquisition by either the entity or the related person of a
corporate interest within ten years after the redemption. 82
Congress thus mandated the position taken by the courts in Crawford
and Johnson Trust. Contrary to the IRS's long-maintained stance, the
term "distributee" in amended section 302(c)(2) now applies to both indi-
viduals and entities. Congress did respond favorably, however, to the
IRS's concern in Crawford that potential for abuse of the tax laws existed
174. Id. at 469-70.
175. Id. at 470.
176. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
177. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 228, 96 Stat. 493, 515 (amending I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(c)).
178. The court noted that, because of the passage of TEFRA § 228, its resolution of the
controversy's issues would not have a lasting effect on the law. 693 F.2d at 468. But see
supra note 23.
179. I.R.C. §302(c)(2)(C)(i)(I) (1982); for the text of this provision, see supra note 24.
180. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(C)(ii)(I) (1982).
181. Id. § 302(c)(2)(C)(ii)(II).
182. Id. § 302(c)(2)(C)(i)(II).
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because the waiver filed by an entity would not prevent beneficiaries from
acquiring a subsequent interest in the corporation. The new law holds
both the entity and the beneficiary liable for any acquisition within ten
years after the redemption.
As outlined in TEFRA section 228 and previously required by section
302(c)(2), an entity may waive only the family attribution rules of section
318(a)(1). 183 Congress has, therefore, overruled the position taken by the
Fifth Circuit in Rickey.184 An entity may file a waiver agreement only
when both the entity and its beneficiaries own no corporate stock immedi-
ately following the redemption, and the beneficiaries must join the entity
in filing the required waiver agreement. 185 As a result, the new law makes
it impossible for an entity to waive the entity attribution rules since this
would require that the entity's beneficiaries still own corporate stock.' 86
This congressional action should appease the critics of the Rickey decision.
TEFRA has supplied some answers regarding the effect that section
302(c)(2), as amended, will have on the tax treatment afforded stock re-
demptions when family hostility is the motivating factor for the redemp-
tion. Since prior to the enactment of TEFRA only a redeeming individual
shareholder could apply the section 302(c)(2) waiver provisions, the enact-
ment of TEFRA has added a new dimension of certainty in areas in which
the courts and the IRS conflicted. Now, in certain situations, when the
redeeming shareholder is an entity and family discord exists, a redemption
that settles the dispute as in Haft Trust can also qualify for capital gain
treatment under section 302(b)(3) without the need for judicial determina-
tion. An entity will no longer need to argue subjectively under Davis that
the redemption resulted in a meaningful reduction in corporate control in
order to qualify for the ambiguous dividend equivalence test under section
302(b)(1). 187 This opportunity, however, is available only when both the
entity and its beneficiaries own no corporate stock following the redemp-
tion. Thus, in settling a family dispute, an entity may qualify for exchange
treatment under section 302(b)(3) only if all the corporate stock owned by
an entity and all of its beneficiaries is redeemed. ' 88 On the other hand, if a
beneficiary owns any stock after the redemption, this stock will be attrib-
uted to the entity under section 318(a)(3). The entity no longer will have
the option to waive these shares attributable to it, but must instead attempt
to qualify for capital gain treatment under section 302(b)(1).189
183. Id. §§ 302(c)(2)(C)(i), 302(c)(2)(A).
184. See H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 545, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1190, 1319-20, which expressly states that the waiver rules do not ex-
tend to entities and their beneficiaries and that Rickey v. United States is intentionally
overruled.
185. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(C)(i) (last paragraph) (1982).
186. See supra notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text.
187. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 48 (Ist Cir. 1975).
188. The factual situation in Haft Trust followed this pattern. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 118-20.
189. The facts presented in Metzger Trust followed this pattern. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 130 & 131.
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One final question, however, remains even after the passage of TEFRA:
when family hostility is the motive for a redemption involving an entity
and related persons, one of whom retains a corporate interest after the
redemption, will the redemption qualify for exchange treatment under the
dividend equivalence test of section 302(b)(1)? Unfortunately, no answer
can be drawn from the conflicting judicial opinions. Consistent with the
Haft Trust decision, however, evidence that family hostility exists in the
above fact situation should be sufficient to qualify a redemption as not
essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1).
As stated by Congress, the rationale behind the attribution rules is that
certain relationships are evidence of a community of economic interest.190
Individuals within these relationships will act in a manner to benefit the
community as a whole. As a result, when one community member's inter-
est in an entity is reduced, this event will not have a significant impact on
the control of the entity if the other community members retain an interest
in the same entity. 191 This rationale is inapplicable when families are di-
vided by hostility since no concern exists that the individual members will
act to benefit the family as a whole. Therefore, the attribution rules should
not be applied to deny exchange treatment to redemptions necessitated by
family hostility. As the IRS argued in Haft Trust, this approach may lead
to abuses if family disputes are fabricated to allow redemption proceeds to
be taxed at capital gain rates. This potential abuse, however, is no excuse
for injustice when family hostility clearly does exist.
Allowing a redemption exchange treatment when family hostility is its
motivating force is also consistent with interpretations of the meaningful
reduction test in Davis.192 As a result of the Davis decision, a redemption
must result in a meaningful reduction of a shareholder's proportionate in-
terest in a corporation to qualify for exchange treatment under section
302(b)(1).193 This test is necessary to prevent a shareholder from redeem-
ing only a portion of his stock interest and still treating the redemption as
an exchange, claiming only that family hostility existed. To qualify as a
meaningful reduction an actual shift in corporate control must occur. 194
As the critics and subsequent court opinions have suggested, the meaning-
ful reduction test permits an inquiry into the facts surrounding a stock
redemption, even after a mechanical application of the attribution rules.
This view has even been promulgated in the IRS's Treasury Regula-
190. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, 4025, 4061.
191. Id
192. See, e.g., Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 1975) ("Section
302(b)(1) requires a 'meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the
corporation'. . . . This language certainly seems to permit, if it does not mandate, an ex-
amination of the facts and circumstances to determine the effect of the transaction . ... "
(Emphasis added.)); Comment, supra note 116, at 104 (circumstances surrounding redemp-
tion should be examined to determine whether in fact a meaningful reduction has occurred
and whether control is mere fiction).
193. Davis, 397 U.S. at 313.
194. Cf. Parker v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893, 899-900 (1961) (father re-
deemed portion of stock interest in order to transfer effective control of corporation to son).
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tions. 195 Thus, Davis would allow a redemption to be afforded capital gain
treatment when family hostility exists and a shift in corporate control
occurs.
Furthermore, although amended section 302(c)(2) does not apply di-
rectly to the situation in which family hostility motivates the stock redemp-
tion by an entity and a beneficiary of the entity retains a stock interest,
Congress's passage of the amended section tends to support the position
that this redemption should be afforded capital gain tax treatment.
Amended section 302(c)(2) clearly broadens the scope under which re-
deeming shareholders may file a statutory waiver. In effect, the section
also broadens the ability of feuding family members to settle disputes
through a stock redemption that is afforded capital gain treatment. Some
certainty as to the tax treatment of stock redemptions has been created by
this new law, enabling shareholders to resolve family discord based on
objective criteria as to the tax consequences. As a logical extension of this
section, though, allowing a redemption necessitated by family hostility ex-
change treatment under section 302(b)(1) would create further certainty.
Taxpayers in this situation, knowing the tax consequences of the redemp-
tion, could effectively plan for these consequences and need not fear that
the IRS might subsequently tax the redemption proceeds at higher ordi-
nary income rates. Some critics might argue that this approach will actu-
ally create less certain tax results because of possible problems in defining
the nature of the hostility necessary to afford a redemption exchange treat-
ment. After a few judicial decisions and IRS clarifications, however, the
type of discord necessary for a redemption to be afforded exchange treat-
ment should be well-defined.
Conclusive resolution of the family hostility issue by allowing redemp-
tion exchange treatment under the dividend equivalence test is consistent
with recent judicial and legislative trends that expand the scope of stock
redemptions that might qualify for capital gain treatment. The Metzger
Trust decision is a lone exception. Further judicial and congressional in-
quiry, however, is still necessary ultimately to resolve the effect of family
hostility on stock redemptions.
V. CONCLUSION
Confusion regarding the tax treatment of stock redemptions has existed
since income tax laws were first enacted. When the redemption has been
motivated by the presence of family hostility, persistent controversy has
prevailed between taxpayers and the IRS. The complexity of Code sec-
tions 302 and 318, which provide the criteria for determining when a re-
demption will qualify for exchange treatment, has only fueled this
controversy. Prior to Metzger Trust, the judicial trend in this litigation was
to allow redemption proceeds to be taxed at capital gain tax rates when the
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955) ("The question whether a distribution in redemption
of stock of a shareholder is not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1)
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.").
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redemption was motivated by family hostility. Other judicial decisions,
consistent with the trend, have broadened the class of shareholders that
could waive the family attribution rules, thus creating objective criteria
upon which more favorable tax treatment could be afforded to some re-
demptions motivated by family hostility. The recent passage of TEFRA
section 228 ultimately mandated the courts' position taken in these opin-
ions, but this new law did not go far enough to resolve the family hostility
issue conclusively. Until the conflicting judicial decisions are resolved or
further legislative action is taken, confusion surrounding the effect of fam-
ily discord upon the dividend equivalence test of section 302(b)(1) will
continue. This confusion must be eliminated; it creates ineffective tax
planning and unnecessarily prolongs family hostility.

